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SUPPLEMENTARY BRIEF OF 
DEFENDANT - APPELLANT 
Additional counsel were recently retained in an advisory or 
5 consultative capacity in this cause. The main brief by Mr. Corrigan was 
61 in the hands of the printer hence it was impractical to make the observa-
7 tions herein set out in said main brief. We trust that the Court will in-
8 dulge this supplementary brief. 
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The parties will be referred to as they appeared in the trial 
Court. Underscoring and other forms of emphases are ours. 
I. LEGAL SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
A. FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES IN EVIDENCE 
This is admtttedly a circumstantial evidence case. Therefore, 
the legal question is: Do the facts in evidence permit legally proper in-
ferences which are sufficient to prove defendant guilty of murder. And 
while this Court is not required to weigh the evidence in a criminal case, 
yet it will look to the record to determine whether the rule of proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt has been disregarded. State v. Petro, 146 Ohio St., 
4 73 (paragraph 11 of syllabus). 
In Ohio it is improper to place an inference upon an inference 
in either a civil or criminal case. Sobolovitz v. Lubric Oil, 107 Ohio St., 
204; State v. Petro, supra, page 499. Therefore, each inference must 
arise directly from a fact, or facts, in evidence before it is proper. Let 
I 
2 criminatory, and see what may be inferred therefrom. Then let us take 
3 the inferences and see if they are legally sufficient to prove guilt. We 
4 shall take the facts in the order and in the manner in which they are men-
5 tioned in Plaintiff-Appellee 's brief in the Court of Appeals, at pages 80-
6 9 0 under the heading; ''The Verdict Was Sustained by Sufficient Evi-
7 dence''. 
8 1. The folded jacket on the couch. 
9 Defendant had a jacket on at 12 :3 0 A. M., while asleep on the 
10 , couch. At about 8:30 A. M. the same morning it was found neatly folded 
11 on the couch. At about 5 :50 A. M., the defendant was seen not wearing 
12 the Jacket. 
13 From the foregoing it could be inferred that the some time be-
14 tween 12 :3 0 and 5 :5 0 A_, M. the defendant removed his jacket. 
15 However, the prosecution seeks to further infer that, since the 
16 defendant removed it, he was fully conscious and alert when he did so and 
17 that, therefore, he was fully conscious and alert immediately before going 
18 up to his wife •s bedroom. The latter inferences are the ones that are 
19 improper and unsupported by the direct evidence. There is not an iota 
20 of direct evidence as to the exact time the jacket was removed or as to 
21 defendant's condition at the time, or that defendant folded said jacket and 
22 placed it on the couch. 
2311 2. The missing T Shirt. 
24 ii At about 12 :30 A. M. the defendant was wearing a T shirt while 
25 asleep on the couch. At about 5:50 A. M. he was bare to the waist, and 
II 
2 in the lake caught on a pier and it had no blood on it - - but let us dis re-
3 gard this for the moment). 
4 From the foregoing it may be inferred that the T shirt was re-
5 moved from his body some time between 12:30 and 5:50 A. M. 
6 The prosecution then argues that from this it could be further 
7 inferred that the defendant himself removed his T shirt. They then seek 
8 to further infer from the inference that defendant removed it that he did 
9 I 
I 10 11 
11 
11 J 
I 
I 
so after the killing, that the defendant somehow destroyed the T shirt and 
that the reason he did so was that his wife's blood was upon it, that.it got 
to be there while he was killing her. Even if the first inference is deem-
I 
12 Ii 
1311 
ed to be justified, certainly the others are not supported by any indepen-
dent evidence and are legally improper. 
14 Ii 
I 
ls Ii 
I 
1611 
11 
3. No struggle in room? 
Plaintiff argues (p. 80 of their appellate court brief) that: 
''Other than the appearance of the victim as she lay on that bed, there was 
17 I 
\1 
II 
no sign of a struggle having taken place in that room with any intruder." 
11 
18 L 
11 
19 ii 
11 
The uncontradicted evidence is that the victim's pajama tops 
were pulled up around her shoulders, one of her legs vlas entirely out of 
ii 
20 !! ii the pajama pants and the top of the pants was pulled down, her body was 
I' 
21 Ii 
22 !1 
11 I: 
)11 
23 n 
Ii 
toward the bottom of the bed and her legs extended out, and she had a 
wound inside her mouth and her teeth were broken in such a way that the 
State's witness Adelson testified such was not caused by any blow from 
I' 24 .; 
-
!] the outside but by something getting inside her mouth and doing the damage. 
25 ii (R. 1806). 
11 
That foreign material was embedded under her finger nails 
!'I 
--
2 doubt that she struggled strenously with her attacker. 
3 The only fair inference that could arise from the foregoing 
4 evidence is that the struggle she put up was confined to the bed. But just 
5 how this is supposed to point to her husband rather than to an intruder as 
6 the attacker is not clear. It would seem to be more consistent with the 
7 picture of her awaking from her sleep to discover an intruder in her room 
8 than with being struck during an argument with her husband. It is cer-
9 tainly unusual, to say the least, for a wife to argue from a prone position. 
10 There is one item of evidence, however, that points directly 
11 away from the defendant as the attacker. And that evidence concerns the 
12 teeth and inside mouth wounds. A fair inference is that she bit her at-
13 tacker. This, coupled with the admitted fact that the defendant bore no 
14 
1 
bite wounds, would point directly away from him as the attacker. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
4. Victim's rings still on her fingers. 
No valid inference can be drawn from this for the reason that 
there is nothing to show that the attacker even knew that she was wearing 
any rings, or that he had either the opportunity or the inclination to remove 
I 
19 lhem if he did know, Some types of intruders would be interested, some 
20 not. It is even possible that the attacker tried to take them off and was 
21 unable to. At page 1745 Dr. Adelson testified that upon arrival of the 
22 I body at the morgue the attendant there had to manipulate the rings to get 
23 them off. 
24 Any attempt to infer anything from the mere presence of the 
25 riI}gs upon her fingers leads immediately to guess and conjecture and no-
II 
·-
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2 5. No evidence of sexual attack. 
3 ' From the mere evidence that one small swab of the vagina pro-
4 duced no sperm the prosecution seeks to infer that she was not sexually 
5 attacked. The sheet was not even tested. 
6 
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The only permissible inference here, favorable to the prosecu-
tion, is that there was not a sexual attack that was successful to the point 
of complete culmination. There is no permissible inference that there 
was no intruder bent upon sexual attack, and certainly no inference that 
there was no intruder of any kind. 
6. Victim's wrist watch. 
The prosecution argues that: ''The evidence clearly establish~ 
i 
I 
that the victim's wrist watch had remained on her wrist for some time 
after the murder because the blood had dried and left an imprint of her 
wrist watch band {a bracelet band) on her wrist. This was the watch 
found in the defendant's den in the same location as was the green bag 
originally." 
The bare fact in evidence is that some kind of an imprint, pre-
sumably of -the watch band, was observed in the blood on her wrist. From 
- -
this the prosecution seeks to infer: (1) that the watch was removed from 
her wrist after she was attacked, (2) that it was not done until after the 
blood had completely dried, and (3) that, therefore, the defendant is the 
only one who was present long enough -to have done that. The latter two 
inferences are not warranted, and are based upon the first. The second 
inference, to-wit, that the blood was dry, is not only not supported by any 
--
-
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fact, to-wit, that blood will begin to congeal by clottive action within sec-
1 
onds after it is exposed to air, and that an object lifted from partially con-( 
' 
' 
gealed blood will leave an imprint that will appear the same when the bloo~ 
later becomes completely dry. Thus, to infer that the watch was removed 
very soon after the attack would probably be permissible. But by whom? 
Anything further along that line sufficient to involve the defendant could 
be reached only by placing inference upon inference. 
The only possible direct inference from this evidence is that 
the watch was removed immediately after the blood started to congeal. 
7. Bloody splotch on pillow. 
From the outline of the splotch it is inferred that it was caused 
by a bloody object. From that inference it is inferred that it was the mur 
der weapon. 
As to the argument that the object must have lain there for a 
considerable time, the same things may be said as were said of the wrist 
watch band under 6. Any blood covered object will certainly leave a 
bloody outline when placed upon an absorbent surface such as a pillow, 
even though removed immediately thereafter. Likewi's"e, the blood would 
begin to congeal almost immediately. All of which means that the object 
(if it was caused by an Object at all} could just as well have been removed 
within a very short time after the murder, and by an outside intruder. 
23 ti The only inference arising directly from the bloody splotch is 
24 
that it "could" have been caused by a bloody object. 
2.5 
8. Blood on defendant's wrist watch. 
II 
evidence 
2 
on the crystal and the upper band of the defendant's watch. There is no 
showing as to whose blood it was, (it was type M, whereas, the victim's 
blood was type MS - R, 4 7 81), and certainly no evidence as to whether it 
5 
came from contact with the body of the victim or the killer (who was cer-
6 tainly bloody whether wounded or not), or another. Certainly a doctor 
7 dealing with injured patients, as the defendant, could get blood on his 
8 
watch at any time. 
9 The only permissible inference is that the watch could have 
10 i 
;I gotten blood on it sometime between 12:30 A. M. and when found the next 
11 day in the green bag in the yard, and even that is stretching things a bit. 
12 Any further inference that the blood got there while it was still being worn 
-
13 Ii by the defendant is wholly groundless and unwarranted. 
14 •. 
9. The green bag. 
15 
To say the least the examination of the bag for blood was very 
16 incomplete and fragmentary. But for purpose of argument only let us 
The prose-
17 
assume that there was no blood showing on the inside lining. 
18 
II 
2 any more than to an outside intruder. 
3 
4 
5 
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10. One bloody smudge on defendant's trousers, but 
no other blood. 
Here is another arrow which points directly away from the de-
fendant as the killer. It is inconceivable that the defendant could have 
stood beside the bed and hit his wife with repeated bloody blows without 
gettirig,many spray spots of blood on some part or parts of his trousers. 
No such spots were present. 
But what inferences can be drawn from the fact of the single 
small splotch later found on the knee of the trousers? 
The only permissible inference to be drawn from the evidence 
is that the defendant got blood on the knew of the trousers at some time. 
But as to just when, where, and how received, the record is 
completely silent, and-no direct inferences arise. It could have been re-
ceived from blood on the killer's person, or at the time of checking his 
wife's body after the crime, or from an injured patient at some time, be-
cause blood does not wash out. Any effort to make this evidence incri-
minating involves placing inference upon inference severalfold. 
11. Absence of finger prints. 
There is some evidence of a scarcity of finger prints and cer-
tain markings which were interpreted as having been made by a rough 
cloth being wiped over certain surfaces. Although this evidence is vague, 
fragmentary and disjointed and far from satisfactory, let us assume for 
purpose of argument that it could be inferred that someone endeavored to 
1 
remove fingerprints. Let us further infer (the second inference) from 
2 that time it was done by the killer. But that is no direct aid in determin-
3 ing that the defendant was the killer. It is just as logical, if not more so, 
to reason that a stranger with a criminal record whose fingerprints are 
5 on file would be more likely to remove fingerprints than a person whose 
6 fingerprints would be expected in the house. 
7 Any line of reasoning leading to the defendant from the simple 
8 facts in evidence involves not only repeated inference upon inference, but 
9 guess and conjecture at its worst. 
10 12. Bloodstains around the house. 
11 The direct evidence was that there were spots on the floors 
12 
about the house that "could" have been blood. But they also "could" 
13 have been from lead oxide, a common ingredient of paint, as well as other 
14 things, according to the same witness. Five such spots were analyzed 
15 
and found to be blood, but they ''could'' have been animal blood as well as 
16 human. There was absolutely no evidence as to how long the blood had 
17 been there, its type, or anything whatsoever to connect said spots (what-
18 ever they were) with the murder in point of time. 
19 From the foregoing even an inference that all the spots were, 
20 in fact, blood is scarcely justified. But even assuming that it is, to fur-
21 ther infer, as the prosecution does, that (1) it was human blood, (2) that it 
22 got there following the killing, (3) that it was the victim's blood (as distin-
23 guished from a bitten or scratched attacker's blood), (4) and that the perso 
24 I dropping it was the defendant, is guess and conjecture at its vicious worst. 
25 I Yet that is not new to the prosecution in this case. 
II 
--
1 The broadest inference p~ssible is 
2 floors of the house at some time during the house's long existence -- but 
3 was it animal or human, and when and how did it get there? 
4 13. Water under defendant's wrist watch crystal. 
5 From the direct evidence that some small amount of water was 
6 found under the crystal the prosecution infers that it came to be there 
7 while defendant was wearing it. This inference may be justified. But 
8 what kind of water was it -- lake water or tap water -- and when and how 
9 
11 
10 II 
ti 
11 ii 
I 
'I I 
1211 
11 
13 :1 
II 
14 11 
11 
15 I 
did it get there? 
Without any further evidence whatsoever on the subject the pro-
secution seeks to infer from the first inference that it was lake water, 
further that it got there after the murder and not before, that it got there 
while he was wearing it, and that it got there when he went into the lake 
to wash off blood that was never shown to be on him in the first place. 
The only justifiable inference might be that some kind of water 
16 got under there some time while he was wearing it. But that is all. 
17 14. The dog, Koko, was not heard to bark. 
18 The only direct evidence, of course, is that no one in the neigh-
19 borhood heard a dog bark during the morning hours of ..i.uly 4, 1954. Even 
20 assuming that the dog was in or near the house and was of the watch dog 
21 type and customarily barked when people approached, none of which was 
22 supported by any evidence, the only thing that can properly be done with 
23 the negative evidence that no one sleeping in adjoining houses heard the 
24 dog bark, is to infer that it is possible that the dog, in fact, did not bark, 
25 or that he did bark and was not heard by any neighbor. 
II 
- 2 heard to blow, the witness must be shown to have been listening and close 
3 i enough to hear. There is no such evidence in the instant case, and a dog 
is under no statutory duty to bark. 
5 15. Burglary picture confused. 
6 The prosecution gratuitously assumes that the burglary was a 
7 fake, and then argues from there. But since when does every burglar, 
8 
especially one in a hurry and with murder on his conscience, act rational-
9 ly and in any set pattern. Any conclusion that the burglary was a fake 
10 
must necessarily be reached by inference, and to further infer that it was 
11 defendant who did it is to place inference upon inference. Another type 
12 ! 
I! of intruder, other than a burglar, could just as well have arranged things 
-
ii 
13 Ii avert suspicion from himself. But the important point is that there is no 
I ~ 
14 :, 
!I direct evidence that the burglary was faked, and certainly none that the 
15 1; 
II 
11 
16 \, 
defendant had anything whatsoever to do with it. 
B. SUMMARY 
17 
18 The fair inferences arising directly from the State's own ev1-
19 -dence in this case can be no more than the following: 
2011 
21 \' 
1. The defendant removed his jacket and placed it on the 
couch some time between 12:30 and 5:50 A. M. (But exactly when and 
22 
under what circumstances these are not disclosed.) 
23 2. The defendant's T. shirt was removed some time between 
24 
-
12:30 and 5 :50 A. M. (But when, by whom, and under what circumstances? 
25 i 3. The struggle between Marilyn and the attacker was con-
II 
II 
--
2 4. The attacker did not remove her rings. (No fair inference 
3 is permissible from this.) 
I 
5. There was no sexual attack involving penetration and emis-' 
sion. 
6. The victim's wrist watch was removed from her wrist im-
mediately after the blood started to congeal. (But exactly when?) 
7. Some object lay on the pillow long enough to leave a bloody 
9 !i blotch. (But what was the object, was it themurder weapon, and just how 
10 long was it there?) 
11 8. Defendant's wrist watch could have gotten blood on it some 
12 time between the time between 12 :3 0 A. M. and the time it was found in 
13 the green bag. (But when, where, how, and whose blood was it?) 
14 • 9. The defendant's watch was in such position, or condition, 
15 :: 
I' 
1: 
,1 
that it left no blood on the inside of the bag. 
16 1: 
17 Ii 
10. Defendant got one small splotch of blood on the right knee 
of his trousers some time. (But when, where, how, and whose blood was 
18 it?) 
11. Someone endea~ored to remove their fin~rprints in the 19 I 
! 20 I house. (But who, when, and why?) 
21 ,I f f 1 d 
·1 12. Various traces o some kind o b oo got on the various 
22 ~floors of the house some time during the years of its occupancy, 
Ii 
23 Ii 
Ii 13. Water got under defendant's watch crystal while he was 
241 1 • \wearing it. (But when, where and how -- and what kind of water was it?) 
I 
25 I 
!, 
14. It is possible the dog did not bark. (But where was the dog, 
II 
--
2 
11 
12 
13 i 
14 : 
15 
16 
17 
181 
19 1\ 
11 
20 i\ 
11 
I 
I' 21 I 
'I 1, 
22 ll 
I! 
i 
23 I 
! 
I 
24
11 
25 'i 
1, 
" I: 
Can anyone say that the foregoing inferences, when taken 
jointly are irreconcilable with the defendant's innocence? Obviously 
not, for whether considered JOintly or severally, they could all be true 
and the defendant still be innocent. And on that state of the record the 
State has failed to prove a case as a matter of law. 
The law on the subject is clearly stated in 15 Ohio Juris-
prudence 2d, pages 63 0-631, Section 462: 
''However, when circumstantial evidence alone 
is relied upon for conviction it must be of 
such a character that it is wholly inconsistent 
with any other conclusion than that the party 
charged is guilty of the crime. The circum-
stances themselves must be clearly proved, and 
must all point in the same direction, and 
together must be irreconcilable with any other 
reasonable hypothesis. All circumstances must 
be consistent and all, taken together, must 
point sure-±y and unerringly to the guilt of 
the defendant, and must be inconsistent with 
any other rational supposition than that the 
defendant is guilty of the offense charged. 
The particular facts and circumstances when 
taken together must be so convincing as to be 
irreconcilable with the innocence of the accused 
or, as said by some authorities, as to admit of 
no other hypothesis than the guilt of accused. 
Not every fact and circumstance in a case-needs 
to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but every 
essential link in the chain of circumstances 
necessary to prove each or any of the charges, as 
claimed by the state, must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The inference which they 
compel should not be that the defendant might have 
done the deed, but that he_actually did it. If 
for _any reason the facts relied on for conviction 
in a criminal prosecution are not consistent each 
with the other, and are not all consistent with 
the hypothesis of guilt and no other hypothesis, 
the state must fail." 
--
2 Ohio Law Abs., 109, the holding of the court is accurately stateq ': 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
"In the prosecution of a criminal case there 
must be either direct or positive proof of 
guilt or facts established from which deductions 
may be made which establish guilt, but such 
deductions cannot rest on probabilities." 
At the risk of being facetious let us compare the proof re-
8 quired in a reported civil case and this case. We can surely agree that 
9 clearer proof is required in a criminal case than in a civil case. And 
10 yet in the famous rat case of Gedra v. Dallmer Co., 153 Ohio St., 258, 
11 this Court unanimously held in paragraph 2 of the syllabus: 
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"2. In a negligence action, it is not sufficient 
for plaintiff to prove that the negligence of 
defendant might have caused an injury to plaintiff 
but, if the injury complained of might well have 
resulted £.rom any one of several causes, it is 
incumbent upon plaintiff to produce evidence which 
will exclude the effectiveness of those causes 
for which defendant is not legally responsible." 
To paraphrase this holding and apply it to a criminal case: 
"in a criminal case it is not sufficient for the prosecution to prove that 
the defendant might have been the perpetrator of the crime, but if the crinw 
complained of might well have been done by another, it is incumbent upon 
the state to produce evidence which will exclude the latter possibility." 
It is clear that the State J:>y its evidence did not exclude the 
possibility that an intruder committed the attack in the instant case. 
C. FACTS INCONSISTENT WITH GUILT 
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would exo.lude tne effectiveness of certain definite facts and circumstances 
for which the defendant was not responsible and which pointed clearly to 
his innocence. 
The principle of law is stated in the syllabus of the Gedra 
case, supra, in the latter part of the second paragraph of the syllabus in 
this language: 
volved. 
some of 
''* * *it is incumbent upon plaintiff to produce 
evidence which will exclude the effectiveness of 
those causes for which defendant is not legally 
responsible.'' 
The Gedra case was a civil action -- only dollars were in-
Here a man's life and liberty are at stake. The following are 
the established facts which the State totally and completely failed 
to explain or to produc~ any evidence to exclude the effectiveness of these 
facts and circumstances for which the defendant was legally not responsi-
ble and which points almost unerringly to the innocence of the appellant. 
( 1) The deceased was engaged in a violent struggle imme-
diately preceding her death. Imbedded and buried under her fingernails 
were foreign articles. One fingernail was practically torn off. The con-
clusion is inescapable that the decedent was violently scratching her as-
sailant. Appellant was lightly clothed. Whether he had on a T shirt or 
didn't there would certainly have been scratches about his body. There 
were no scratches on him. 
(2) Blood was splattered over the bed, the floor and the 
-2 
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lant's trousers there was no blood whatsoever on the trousers, shoes, 
belt or wearing apparel of the Appellant. 
(3) There were wool fibers, of different colors, imbedded 
under the nails of the deceased, as well as bits of leather. Such fibers 
were found not to be present in the clothing of the defendant or in any clot 
ing in his home. 
(4) Lacerations and abrasions found inside of the deceased's 
9 mouth. A tooth was broken off leaving a jagged edge·. There were in-
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juries to other teeth. 
I 
The State's expert testified that the injuries inside 
the mouth including the bro ken teeth did not come from any external ap-
plication of force, but came from some object thrust into the mouth of the 
deceased. He indicated that it was the finger probably of the assailant. 
If this be true then the assailant's finger would certainly have been bitten 
or scratched. There were no scratches, cuts or injuries about the hand 
or fingers of the defendant, or elsewhere on his body. 
(5) A chip of tooth was found under the bed of Mrs. Shep -
pa rd. It was not a part of any of her teeth. It was not a part of the tooth 
of her husband, the defendant. Whose tooth or chip of tooth was it? A 
piece of leather or leatherette was found in the bedroom. This material 
was carefully compared by the police to defendant's belt, wallet, shoes 
and all other leather articles in the house. These bits of leather or lea-
therette were not the defendant's, nor did they come from any of his wear-
ing apparel or any object in the house. Did they come from a leather 
jacket of deceased 's assailant? That is a proper inference. However, 
2 (6) A cigarette butt was found in the toilet upstairs. It 
3 had not been smoked by Mrs. Sheppard the deceased. The defendant did 
4 not smoke cigarettes. Whose cigarette was it? It was neither the de-
5 ceased's or the defendant's. Two reputable citizens Leo Scawitki and 
6 Richard Knitter were in the vicinity of defendant's home in the early 
7 morning of July 4th. They were strangers to the defendant. They re-
8 ported to the police that they had seen a bushy haired person very similar 
9 to the person described by the defendant, in the vicinity of the murder 
10 premises. These two men volunteered their information to the police 
11 before ever seeing or hearing or knowing about Sam Sheppard, the defen-
12 dant. That testimony was undisputed in the slightest. The man they saw 
13 may well have been the man who committed the murder. • He was there, 
14 at or near the premises in the early morning and Mrs. Sheppard was mur-
15 dered that morning sometime between 12:30 A. M. and 5:30 A. M. 
16 The direct evidence of the two witnesses above mentioned 
17 was produced by the defen.dant. The circumstances above set out were 
18 elicited from the witnesses for the State. Neither the direct evidence, 
19 nor the circumstances above outlined were denied, refuted, explained or 
20 in any other way attacked or even questioned by the State. Such facts and 
21 such circumstances so established present a situation where as a matter 
2/. of law the conclusion must be that the State failed to present or adduce 
23 evidence to convict beyond a reasonable doubt. Here are facts and cir-
-
24 cumstances, unquestioned by the State, that are thoroughly consistent with 
25 innocence. 15 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d, page 631, Section 462, lays down 
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''All circumstances must be consistent and all, 
taken together, must point surely and unerringly 
to the guilt of the defendant, and must be 
inconsistent with any other rational supposition 
than that the defendant is guilty of the offense 
charged.'' 
The evidence does not meet this test in the instant case; 
therefore, it is legally insufficient under the laws of Ohio. 
D. PROOF OF SECOND DEGREE -- LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT. 
The defendant was charged with first degree murder, was 
found guilty of second degree murder, and the trial court also charged 
upon first degree manslaughter. Therefore, under the court's charge 
• 
and the law the jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt not only that 
Sam Sheppard killed his wife, but that he had the intent to kill her as dis-
tinguished from killing her in hot blood. It must be remembe-red. that 
the state's theory and argument was that he got into an argument with his 
wife, lost his temper, and killed her. Certainly the beating the victim 
received is just as consistent, and probably more consistent, with hot 
blood than with cold intent. Where then, is the evidence from which the 
jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the 
required legal intent to kill? 
The law on the subject is clearly expressed in 15 Ohio 
Jurisprudence 2d, 641, Section 470: 
"The state, in criminal cases, is held to a 
1 
2 
3 
strict degree of proof. 
the state must not only establish its case beyond 
a reasonable doubt, but also each element of the 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt.'' 
4 It is one thing to say that a jury may infer intent to kill in 
5 cold blood from the facts and circumstances in evidence in the case, but 
6 what are those facts and circumstances in the instant case? Surely, if 
7 they exist, they are capable of expression. And yet, what are they? 
8 If the husband was the killer, which we emphatically deny, 
9 the evidence, to say the least is equally consistent with hot blood as with 
10 cold blood. And any effort to choose the greater over the lesser can in-
11 volve nothing better than guess and conjecture. Evidence which leaves 
12 the proof in equipoise is clearly not sufficient; even proof making the 
13 greater more probable than the lesser is not sufficient in a criminal case. 
14 The proof of intent to kill in cold blood must be beyond a reasonable-
15 doubt, and this involves proof to a moral certainty. Such proof against 
16 this defendant does not exist. 
17 For these reasons the evidence is legally insufficient to 
18 prove beyond a reasonable doubt an intent to kill in cold blood, and for 
19 that reason is legally insufficient to support the verdict of the jury and 
20 sentence of the Court. 
21 
II. ERRORS IN CHARGE OF COURT 
22 
23· A. Charge on Motive. 
24 Following is the court's entire charge on the subject of 
25 
motive: 
II 
1 ''The law does not require the State 
motive in this case. The presence or absence of 
2 motive shown by the evidence may be considered 
by you in determining intent, or its presence or 
3 absence in the mind of the defendant Sam H. 
Sheppard, so that if you find beyond a reasonable 
4 doubt that the defendant is guilty of any offense 
under these instructions, then you should find 
5 him guilty whether or not a motive has been 
established." 
6 
7 The jury was charged that motive was to be considered for 
8 one purpose only, to-wit, to determine the issue of "intent" to kill or lack 
9 thereof. And this was to be done by the jury only after they had deter-
10 mined the guilt of the accused. The necessary effect of this charge was 
11 to inform the jury that the existence of a motive, or absence thereof, was 
12 of no importance in their determination of the issue of whether or not the 
13 accused was guilty. 
14 In this admittedly circumstantial evidence case this was 
15 error and it no doubt prejudiced the defendant. It meant that the jury was 
16 free to discuss and decide the all important question of the accused's 
17 guilt or innocence of the killing without once considering the matter of 
18 motive. 
19 The law of Ohio is that: "the presence or absence of motive 
20 is a circumstance which should be weighed by the jury in deliberating upon 
21 the guilt of the accused". 15 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d, 268, Sec. 30 - Mo-
22 
tive. Manifestly there is a broad difference between determining "the 
guilt of the accused" and determining the degree of that guilt. 
24 The charge of the Gourt did not permit the jury to do its duty 
25 
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fendant guilty of the killing without first considering and weighing the 
presence or absence of motive. This was an error of commission of 
grossest proportions. 
B. Charge on General Conduct and Reputation Evidence. 
Evidence both favorable and unfavorable to the accused was 
introduced on this subject. The State introduced such evidence as part 
of their case in chief. No former acts of violence were shown. It will 
be noted that in its charge the trial court treated such evidence generally 
and without regard to where in the trial it was presented or for what limi-
ted purpose it was presented. 
The Court charged the jury as follows, as shown at pages 
7 006- 7007 of the record: 
''Some evidence has been given in this case 
concerning the claimed general conduct and 
reputation of the defendant and it is proper 
to present such evidence for your consideration. 
It is not admitted because it furnishes proof 
of guilt or innocence but because it is a 
matter of common knowledge that people of good 
character and reputation do not generally commit 
serious or major crimes. Such evidence, if 
believed, may be of some help to you in your 
consideration of the total evidence and the 
situation as a whole. The court wishes to 
caution you, however, that good character and 
a good reputation will not avail any person 
charged with a crime against proof of guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt.'' 
The accused specifically excepted to the foregoing and re-
quested the following charge vmich the court refused (R 7014): 
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''The defendant takes exception. to that part 
of the charge, and requests the Court to 
charge that 
'If evidence of reputation and character shall 
be considered by the jury in connection with all 
the other evidence in the case, and if the 
evidence of good reputation and character, taken 
in consideration with the other evidence, raises 
a reasonable doubt of guilt, the defendant may not 
be found guilty.' 
The Court overrules that." 
1. Too Broad and One-Sided. 
The probable effect of the court's charge as given and its 
refusal to charge further, was to inform the jury that evidence of the 
accused's general conduct and reputation could be used against him, but 
12 not in his favor. This is not the law. 
13 
14 
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17 
It may also be said that the court instructed the jury to con-
sider the evidence of character and reputation without telling them what 
use they were to make of it. 
1 on Another reason the court erred in charging so generr 
.:-nduct 
the subject and without limitation, is that the so-called genera~• 
18 evidence introduced during the state's case in chief showe "'solutely no 
19 propensity toward any act of violence. 
20 of 
21 Character or admitted in 
22 :rove propensity, to-wit, 
23 .l 
r 
24 in fraud and deceit crimes. ,~ \. 
25 But in the case at bar previous. acts of philandering and falsi-
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fication were used by the State to help prove a case of murder, and th~"' 
jury was charged that: "it is a matter of common knowledge that people 
of good character and reputation do not generally commit serious or 
major crimes''. This leaves the unmistakable inference and innuendo 
that people of less than good character and reputation generally do commit 
serious and major crimes -- otherwise why mention it. This was pre-
judicial to the accused. 
charge: 
2. Jury Denied Permission to Consider Evidence of 
Good Character in Determining Guilt or Innocence. 
The glaring error of commission is the following part of the 
"It (evidence and general conduct and reputation} 
is not admitted because it furnishes proof of 
guilt or innocence''. 
The Court entirely divorced good character and reputation 
from proof of guilt, and instructed the jury to do likewise. They must· 
not be divorced, for the former must be considered in reaching a conclu-
sion upon the latter. The defense's request to charge contains a correct 
statement of the law, and the court committed prejudicial error in refus-
ing to give it. 
The law of Ohio is perhaps best expressed in the case of 
State v. Hare, 87 Ohio St., 204. In that case the reporting judge, after 
citing with approval the cases of Harrington v. State, 19 Ohio St., 264, and 
Stewart v. State, 22 Ohio St., 477, said at page 213: 
"The author has given the matter full consi-
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deration, and emphatically declares that 
evidence of good character must always be 
considered not alone, but in connection 
with all the evidence bearing upon the guilt 
or innocence of the accused." 
The following statement of the law on the subject is found in 
15 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d, Section 462, at pages 628 and 629: 
ing the jury 
•'Good character does not alone establish 
innocence. It is merely a fact or circum-
stance bearing upon the defendant's guilt, 
or the grade of the offense, where the crime, 
consists of various grades. The weight which 
is to be given to such evidence is a question 
for the jury under all the circumstances 
involved. * * * Sometimes evidence of good 
character is of great weight and importance in 
repelling a criminal charge. * * * Its weight 
is not confined to doubtful cases, however; 
it may of itself create a doubt. 
'' * * *But if, after considering all the 
evidence, including that of good character, the 
jury entertain a reasonable doubt as to the 
defendant's guilt, they must give him the benefit 
of the doubt and return a verdict of not guilty." 
The Court's charge in the instant case had the effect of tell-
to consider such evidence in the abstract only and unrelated 
to the other evidence; the requested charge stating the correct and full 
rule of law on the subject was refused. 
3. Charge Grossly Deficient. 
The gross deficiency in the court's general charge, on this 
subject, as distinguished from the foregoing error of commission, and the 
absolute necessity of giving the additional charge which was refused, is 
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best shown by the statements made in the case of Watha v. State, 14 
0. C. C. (N. S. ) 145, wherein the court said, at pages 15 0-151: 
''The testimony shows that testimony of this 
character was submitted to the jury. On page 
1104 of the record, the court, in instructing 
the Jury on this subject, said: 
'~ ~ The defendant introduced evidence tending to 
show his good character for peace and quietness. 
If, in the present case, the good character of 
the defendant for peace and quietness is proven 
to your satisfaction, then such fact should be 
kept in view by you in all your deliberations, 
and it is to be considered by you in connection 
with all the other facts in the case; and if, 
after the consideration of all the evidence in 
the case, including that bearing upon the good 
character of the defendant, the jury entertain 
a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, 
it is your duty to acquit him. But if the 
evidence convinces you, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, of defendant's guilt, you must so find, 
notwithstanding his good character.' 
* * * * * * * 
"And while we think that this instruction to the 
jury, if standing alone and not qualified by 
any other instruction given to the jury upon 
this subject, either before or after it was so 
given, would perhaps be erroneous, an examination 
of the record shows that the following sped.al 
charge was given by the court to the jury at the 
request of the plaintiff in error, before argument: 
"Request No. 20. 'If the evidence of good reputation, 
taken in connection with the other evidence, raises 
in your minds a reasonable doubt of Watha 's guilt 
of the murder charge made in the indictment, you can 
not find him guilty of such murder charge.' " 
The court's charge in the instant case, and its refusal to 
charge as requested, falls far short of the legal requirements on the sub-
ject as expressed in the foregoing authorities. It constituted prejudicial 
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error and requires reversal. 
c. Charge on Circumstantial Evidence. 
1. In General. 
The meat of the Court's charge on this subject is found at 
pages 7005-7006 of the record, and is as follows: 
requisites 
''It is necessary that you keep in mind, and you 
are so instructed, that where circumstantial 
evidence is adduced it, together with all other 
evidence, must convince you on the issue 
involved beyond a reasonable: doubt and that 
where circumstantial evidence alone is relied 
upon in the proof of any element essential to a 
finding of guilt such evidence, together with any 
and all other evidence in the case, and with all 
the facts and circumstances of the case as found 
by you mu~t be such as to convince you beyond a 
reasonable doubt and be consistent only with the 
theory of guilt and inconsistent with any theory 
of innocence. If evidence is equally consistent 
with the theory of innocence as it is with the 
theory of guilt it is to be resolved in favor of 
the theory of innocence.'' 
The court's charge is neither clear nor complete. 
It is not clear for the reason that, when speaking of the 
of proof by circumstantial evidence, the court tells the jury, 
in effect, that they can buttress and support the circumstantial evidence 
by "other facts and circumstances of the case as found by you" with-
23 out defining or limiting how such other facts and circumstances are 
24 first to be found. The charge does not prohibit the finding of facts 
'° and circumstances by inference and conjecture and then using them 2., 
--
l to support, and thereby make 
I! 
21: court says, in part: ''where Circumstantial evidence alone is relied 
3 upon in the proof of any element essential to a finding of guilt such evi-
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dence, together with any and all other evidence in the case, and with all 
the facts and circumstances of the case as found by you must be such as 
to convince you beyond a reasonable doubt and consistent only with the 
theory of guilt and inconsistent with any theory of innocence". 
Then, after the foregoing, the court commits a most grievous 
error by laying down a preponderance test: 
''If evidence is equally consistent with the 
theory of innocence as it is with the theory 
of guilt it is to be resolved in favor of the 
theory of innocence." 
The necessary effect of what the court says is that if the 
evidence is in equipoise as to guilt or innocence, the jury must find him 
innocent. This is the civil rule of preponderance. 
The correct criminal rule is not that the evidence must be 
equally consistent with innocence as with guilt, to find innocence, but rather 
that if it is possible to reconcile the facts in evidence with innocence, he 
must be found innocent. 15 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d, pp. 766-768, Sec.599--
Circumstantial Evidence; State v. Butler, 5 7 Abs. 385, 386-3 87; Fess, 
Ohio Instructions to Juries, 8.15, 86.23, 87.16. 
The charge of the court was specifically excepted to, and the 
accused asked for the following additional instruction which was refused 
(R. 7015): 
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'' 'Where reliance for conviction is placed on 
circumstantial evidence, the JUry is instructed 
that the facts and circumstances upon which the 
theory of guilt is based should be shown beyond 
a reasonable doubt, and when taken together 
must be so convincing as to be irreconcilable 
with innocence and admit of no other hypothesis 
than guilt.' 
"THE GOUR T: Exceptions overruled, and excep-
tions noted to the defendant." 
This instruction is taken almost verbatim from the rule laid 
down in the case of Carter v. State, 4 Ohio App., 193, 196, and is supporte 
by the decisions of State v. Knapp, 5 0 Bull. 28, and State v. Mueller, 54 
BulL 94, and recognized with approval in 15 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d, p. 767, 
Sec. 599. 
In the case of City of Columbus v. Treadwell, 46 Ohio Law 
Abs., 367, Judge Hornbeck, speaking for the Court of Appeals which re-
versed the conviction, said at page 374: 
necessary 
''The same rule as to the quantum of proof upon 
circumstantial evidence attends in Ohio. First 
syllabus of Carter v. State, 4 Oh Ap 193: 
" 'Where reliance for conviction is placed 
on circumstantial evidence, the jury should 
be instructed that the facts and circumstances 
upon which the theory of guilt is based should 
be shown beyond a reasonable doubt, and when 
taken together must be so convincing as to be 
irreconcilable with the claim of innocence and 
admit of no other hypothesis than the guilt 
of the accused.• " 
Not only was the requested charge a Pit"·Oper one, but it was 
to clarify and make complete the general charge on the same 
--
1 general subject. The refusal to give it constitut~d "i>rej~dlclal erro'r:, 
2 Even if the first part of the court's charge on this subject 
3 of quantum of evidence should be considered proper, yet that part thereof 
'l erroneously incorporating the equipoise doctrine requires reversal. As 
5 was held in the syllabus of State v. Hauser, 101 Ohio St., 404: 
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''2. Where two rules as to the quantum of 
evidence required of the accused are given to 
the jury, the one correct and the other 
erroneous, the court will not presume that 
the jury followed the correct rule to the 
exclusion of the incorrect rule." 
Refusal to give a proper charge is prejudicial error, and 
failure to charge further after attention is called by even a technically 
erroneous request, has been held reversible error. In 15 Ohio Juris-
prudence Zd, at pages 744-746, the following statement of the subject is 
found: 
"578. Refusal to Give Requested Instructions; 
Request for Incorrect or Inapplicable Instructions. 
-- It is prejudicial error in a criminal case to 
refuse to give a requested charge which is pertinent 
to the case, states the law correctly, and is not 
covered by the general charge * * * :;r'his is true 
though the request is made at the close of the 
general charge. 
* * * * * * * * * * 
"It (the trial court) is not bound to ignore a 
requested instruction because it is not, strictly 
speaking, an accurate statement of the law involved. 
The court may properly treat it as a suggestion 
for a proper charge on the theory which counsel for 
defense entertains. In fact, it has been said not 
to be sufficient in all cases for the court merely 
to refuse the charge because it does not correctly 
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state the la'W. In a case of magnitude and diffi-
culty, some instruction on the point should be 
given.'' 
Thus even if the requested charge on the subject should be 
considered technically inaccurate, which we do not believe it is, yet it 
called the trial court's attention to the insufficiency of his general charge 
on the point and the court should have charged further in order to clarify 
and complete the general charge as given. 
2. The "George Washington" Example. 
To say the least the court it'\ its charge gave the jury a most 
unfortunate choice of an example of circumstantial evidence. The exam-
ple used bore too close a relation to some of the facts of this case, and 
could easily have misled the jury by oversimplifying the necessities of 
proof in their minds. At pages 7004- 7005 of the record the court charged 
the jury as follows: 
"Illustrating now what would be direct evidence, 
let us assume that I had on a certain day a very 
fine cherry tree in my yard. The family happens 
to be away on that day and when I return about 
5 o'clock in the evening I find my cherry tree 
chopped down. I proceed to investigate and first 
make inquiry of my next door neighbor Mr. Smith. 
I ask him if he saw any stranger doing anything 
in my yai:d on that day. He replies: 'Yes, I 
saw George Washington chop it down with an ax.' 
That would constitute direct evidence because Mr. 
Smith is relying on his own sense of sight and 
states what he himself saw with his own eyes. For 
that reason he is able to give direct evidence 
that George Washington chopped down that cherry 
tree. 
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"Let us now consider a case of Circum'sta~tt~l :' 
Evidence in the same connection. Assume that on 
inquiry of Mr. Smith, my neighbor, he, in answer 
to my question, says that he did not see anyone 
chopping down my tree. I then ask him: 'Did you 
see anyone about my place today?' He replies: 
'Yes, I saw George Washington walk along your 
driveway from the yard to the street with an ax 
on his shoulder.' Here is evidence of a fact 
which does not directly prove who chopped down 
my cherry tree but which permits a natural and 
fair inference that George Washington was in my 
yard with an ax combined with the fact that my 
tree was chopped down would constitute very 
definitely a piece of circumstantial evidence to 
be weighed in the consideration of a charge against 
George involving the act of chopping down that 
tree." 
Regardless of the latter generalized part of the charge, 
which would mean little to a layman at best, the example given, to-wit, 
proof of guilt by mere presence near the scene and possession of the rnea 
of commission, could well have deceived the JUry. The example used is 
deceptive because of its oversimplified similarity to the state's theory in 
the instant case, to-wit, proof of guilt from the mere circumstances of 
Sam Sheppard's presence in the house at the time of killing and that the 
murder weapon "could" have been a surgical instrument. The same 
basic issue was involved in the example as in the case being tried, to-wit, 
the identity of the person performing the criminal act. The jury was told, 
in effect, that George Washington could be found guilty solely because he 
was nearby and possessed a means of commission. 
The types of approved examples customarily given are those 
involving the conclusion of snowfall or rainfall from the circumstantial 
evidence of going to bed with the ground clear or dry and waking up in the 
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morning with the ground being covered with snow or being' we't:'' ""5.U~b. ' 
examples are approved because they are accurate and yet innocuous, be-
cause they bear no similarity to the facts or issues in the case being 
t.ried. However, that is not true in the instant case. And it is safe to 
say that a snow or rain example would be deceptive and not properly given 
where the issue of snow or rain was the principal part of the state's cir-
cumstantial evidence case. 
The example used, when added to the court's confused and 
incomplete charge on the whole general subject, constitutes prejudicial 
error. 
III. DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
The defendant was denied his constitutional rights guaranteed 
by Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of the state of Ohio and the due 
process amendment to the Constitution of the United States, the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
The Section of the Ohio Constitution above referred to pro-
vides in part as follows: 
"* * * in any trial, in any court, the party 
accused shall be allowed to appear and defend 
in person and with counsel; * * *" 
Volume XII of the Bill of Exceµtions bottom of page 7023-24 
discloses the following: 
"(Thereupon, on this same evening, the following 
was dictated into the record by the Court:) 
--
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that their deliberations were not progressing 
satisfactorily, he, nevertheless, at the suggestion 
of counsel for the defense, called all counsel to-
gether in the early evening, and after discussion 
of the situation, indicated that he would, unless 
some report came by 10:00 or 10:30 p. m., have the 
Bailiff carry to the jury an inquiry from the Court. 
At about 10:00 p. m. this was done. The inquiry that 
would be made had been made known to all counsel. 
The inquiry to the jurors was verbal and was as 
follows: 
" 'Have you arrived at a verdict? If not, is 
there a probability that you can arrive at one if 
you deliberate a while longer either this evening 
or tomorrow? If so, which would you prefer?' 
''The Bailiff knocked at the door and propounded the 
questions to the juror who responded. The juror 
closed the door and in a few moments returned and 
stated that the jury had not arrived at a verdict, 
but that the jury was very close to agreement and 
would prefer to retire for the night and return the 
next morning for deliberation. This was communicated 
to all counsel in chambers and preparations made to 
have the jury retire for the night." 
It might be observed that rather than being close to agree-
jury reconvened the next morning and continued to deliberate 
18 until 4:33 P. M. of the next day, December 21, 1954. It should be further 
19 noted that something had occurred, or proceedings had in the trial were 
20 not in the presence of the defendant, or the Court Reporter, but that the 
21 Court itself dictated from its own recollections what had occurred. 
22 At any rate matters of vital importance to the defendant were 
23 discussed in his absence. He may have been available in the Court room 
24 or he may have been in Jail. The Court did not state in its dictated re-
25 collection where the defendant was, but from what the Court did dictate 
--
l he was not in chambers with counsel and 
2 ings were had and certain communications to the jury were discussed. 
3 The public likewise was not permitted to know what went on during this 
4 phase of the case. 
5 It certainly was of vital importance to the defendant that he 
6 know what the Court proposed to do relative to the jury and what corn-
7 rnunications he proposed to send to the jury by his bailiff. This whole 
8 procedure should have occurred in open Court in the presence of the de-
9 fondant and in the presence of the public. Whatever communication that 
10 is said was given to the bailiff and what communication the bailiff gave 
11 to the jury is unknown, but had the jury been brought into its box then a 
12 record would have been made. The important point is that by the Court's 
13 own words certain communications were prepared to be sent to the ju11y 
14 while Court and counsel were in chambers and in the absence of the de-
15 fendant. 
16 In an early case being that of Kirk v. State of Ohio, 14 Ohio 
17 Reports, 511, the syllabus states the law of the case in this language: 
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••A Court or Judge has no right to communicate 
with the Jury respecting the charge of the 
Court, after the Jury has retired, except 
publicly, and in the presence of the accused. 
To do so is good cause for a new trial." 
Though the matter discussed in the absence of the defendant 
1n the Kirk case had to do with a part of the charge or instructions, yet 
the principle of the law is the same. The Court should not have any corn-
rnunications with the jury or discuss any phase of the case in the absence 
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of the defendant or the public. The 
general principle in this language: 
''The Court charged with his trial, have no right 
to hold any communication with the' Jury touching 
his case, except in the presence of the prisoner, 
and before the public." 
At page 512 of the Opinion after stating the constitutional 
provision relative to the rights of an accused in a trial the Court says·: 
"It is his right to have a public trial, that he 
shall meet the witnesses face to face, before the 
public; and that all that can be said or preferred 
against him, and all that can be said or urged in 
his favor, shall be in the hearing and presence of 
the public." 
• The constitutional provision emphasizes two basic features 
of a criminal trial. One the right of the accused and the other the rights 
of the public. The public is interested in the trial of causes. If courts 
infringe without sound reason upon the rights of the public to know what 
transpires in a trial we are then denied a basic principle of peoples gov-
ernment, that is that the public shall know what transpires in the court 
room. The rights of the accused are of course sacred. 
In the instance at bar the Court denied to the public informa-
tion to which it was entitled to have and denied to the defendant his right 
under the Constitution to be present and in person when pha$es of the trial 
are being discussed. What transpired between the bailiff and the jury 
nobody knows excepting the bailiff and one juror. The Court ob'lliously 
did not hear the conversation between the bailiff and the juror. Had the 
-defendant been present and in open Court he may 
2 since the jury was close to an agreement that it continue to deliberate 
3 at least another half or three-quarters of an hour. The jury may have 
4 reached a verdict that night far different than it did after hours and hours 
5 of further discussion the next day. This, of course, is speculation. How-
6 ever, under the Constitutional provision all matters of speculation should 
7 be reduced to a minimum by a Presiding Judge at a trial. 
8 State of Ohio v. Delzoppo, 86 Ohio App., 381, states the law 
9 in the syllabus as follows: 
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discloses 
'' 1. The defendant in a criminal action has a 
constitutional right to a public trial and to 
be present at every phase of it. 
"2. The right of one accused of crime to a 
public trial and to be present at it can not 
be waived by his counsel. 
"3. In a criminal trial, the accused being in 
the court room awaiting the deliberations of the 
jury on its verdict, it is prejudicial error for 
the court and both counsel in an adjacent room 
and in the absence of the accused to discuss and 
prepare in writing and send to the jury an 
answer to a question of law submitted by it 
to the court." 
The Court's own dictation in the record of what occurred 
that there was a discussion of some phase of the case in charn-
bers between the Court and counsel and the defendant was not present. 
Where he was the record does not disclose, but I assume that he was in 
the court room and readily available. If he was in Jail then the error be-
comes more pronounced as he was forcibly deprived of a constitutional 
-' . j ' . ~· • 
that was his . 
.At page 384 of the Delzoppo case is the following from the 
3 Opinion: 
'l "This being a violation of the accused's positive 
constitutional right to a public trial and to be 
5 present at it, his counsel could not waive it, 
and the fact that his counsel were in the presence 
6 of the court and participated in what was done did 
not cure the error--so said the court in both the 
7 Jones and Grisafulli cases." 
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Jones v, The State of Ohio, 26 Ohio St., 208, was decided per 
curiam rn this language, pages 209 and 210: 
"We are unanimously of op1n1on, that on the trial 
of a felony it is error to proceed, at any stage 
of the trial, during the enforced absence of the 
accused, save only in the matter of the secret 
deliberations of the jury, and perhaps in the 
hearing of motions after verdict and before 
Judgment. 
''It was the right of the plaintiff in error to 
be present at each and every instruction given 
to the jury as to the law of the case. This 
right was denied to him by reason of his 
imprisonment under the order of the court; and 
without inquiry as to the correctness of the 
instruction so given in his absence, it will be 
presumed that he was prejudiced thereby. 
''Nor was the irregularity cured by the presence 
of his counsel at the time the additional 
instruction was given, and his failure to make 
objections. The right of the accused to be 
present on the trial of such case can not be 
waived by counsel." 
.As late as the case of State v. Grisafulli, 135 Ohio St., 87, 
the court in its Opinion at page 91 approves Rose v. State, 20 Ohio, 31, 33, 
--
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by quoting with approval from that case as follows: 
''We conceive it to be the right of an accused 
person to be present during the trial of his 
case, and at the return of the verdict, and we 
~that when deprived of these privileges by 
being imprisoned in a jail, or in any other 
improper manner, the verdict returned against 
him should not be followed by judgment or 
sentence of the court, but a new trial should 
be ordered if requested." 
The right of the accused to be present at all times and dur-
1ng all phases of the case, is also required by common law as well as by 
the Constitution. A concise statement of the law on the subject is con-
tained rn 14 American Jurisprudence, 898-900: 
''A principle that pervades the entire law of 
criminal procedure is that after an indictment 
is found, nothing shall be done except in the 
presence of the prisoner or his counsel, except 
in certain cases of misdemeanors. At common law 
and under the decisions of many courts it is the 
right of the prisoner in a criminal case to be 
present throughout the entire trial from the 
commencement of the selection of the jury until 
the verdict is rendered and jury discharged. 
Constitution or secured by statutes, and a 
denial thereof is good cause for reversing a judgment 
against a defendant. 
* * * * * * * 
"To be present, it is not sufficient that the 
defendant be within the walls of the courthouse; he 
should be present where the trial is conducted, 
so that he may see and be seen, hear and be 
heard. * * * 
"The right to be present extends to every part 
of the trial proper. The .defendant should be 
present on arraignment in felony cases, when 
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evidence is given, when the jury is charged, 
when the court communicates with the jury in 
answering questions by them, when the Jury 
receives further instructions,•• etc. 
In Ohio it has lbeen held that the accused must be present 
when the JUry is called out to report its progress. Bennett v. State, 
l 0 C. C. 84, 4 C. D. l 2 9 . The Court there based its ruling upon the 
Constitution and the cases of Jones v. State, supra, and Cantwell v. State, 
l 8 Ohio St., 4 77. The relevant headnotes in the Bennett case are: 
"2. On the trial of a felony the accused has 
the right to be present in court, when any 
proceeding, of whatever nature, except the 
secret deliberations of the JUry, are taken in 
his case. 
"3. The accused is entitled to have the 
deliberations of the jury continue undisturbed 
and uninterfered with, and it is error for the 
Judge, during the enforced absence of the 
accused, to hold a conversation with the jury 
which might influence their verdict, and prevent 
the defendant from having a fair trial in the 
case. 
• '4. The presumption of law is that where error 
has intervened in a criminal case, it is 
prejudicial to the defendant." 
As is shown previously, the error of the trial court in the 
instant case was twofold: ( 1) it communicated with the jury privately 
through the bailiff, and (2) it had the jury report its progress in the ab-
sence of the accused. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
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Constitutional questions, under both the Ohio an~,,.Un~te·d·,~ 
States Constitution, exist in this case which require the attention of this 
Court and reversal of the judgment. 
The rule requiring proof of each and every issue beyond a 
reasonable doubt has been disregarded, and this Court is duty bound to 
look to the record on that subject and take the necessary corrective 
action. 
Errors prejudicial to the rights of the accused have inter-
vened, and the accused has not had a fair and impartial trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PAUL M. HERBERT 
RUSSELL E. LEASURE 
ARTHUR E. PETERSILGE 
Of Counsel for Defendant-Appellant 
